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Article 6

Restating Childhood
Susan Frelich Appleton†
INTRODUCTION
As the American Law Institute (ALI) contemplates
undertaking work on children and law, several challenges loom
large, especially challenges of conceptualization, framing, and
scope. I use this brief essay as an opportunity to express my
enthusiasm for an ALI project on children, despite the
minefields along the way. My principal objective is to show why
children merit their own “Restatement of” and their own fresh
analytical approach, in place of reliance on familiar frames and
tempting analogies.
Part I outlines a series of problems characterizing the
present legal treatment of children, including the contradictions
and unarticulated assumptions that this treatment reflects. Part
II examines the role that the ALI might play in addressing these
problems, based on the types of work the ALI undertakes, the
process the ALI uses, and the underlying objectives of any ALI
project: clarifying, modernizing, and improving the law.1 In
considering possible responses to the challenges of restating
childhood, I canvass two familiar legal approaches to children
† Lemma Barkeloo & Phoebe Couzins Professor and Vice Dean, Washington
University School of Law. In the interest of full disclosure, I note that I write as a
member of the American Law Institute (ALI) who has played an active role, serving as
Secretary 2004–2013 and on the Council since 1994, and who recently has been
advocating for more attention to family law generally and this project on children more
specifically. I express my thanks to the band of persistent ALI members who
participated in preliminary conversations over the last two years about possible work
on children (Nina Dethloff, Herma Hill Kay, Solangel Maldonado, Melissa Murray,
Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Reginald Leamon Robinson, and Anne Tamar-Mattis); to
Anne Dailey and Laura Rosenbury for their thoughtful efforts to launch the project; to
Lance Liebman and Stephanie Middleton for their patience, encouragement, and
guidance; to Anita Bernstein for organizing and Brooklyn Law School for hosting the
Restatement of . . . symposium, which generated this essay; to Annette Appell, Anne
Dailey, Herma Hill Kay, Courtney Joslin, Laura Rosenbury, and participants in the
Children’s Issues Discussion Group at the 2013 SEALS Annual Conference, all of
whom provided valuable comments on earlier drafts; to the Israel Treiman Faculty
Fellowship (2012–2013) and Dean Kent Syverud for support; and to Amanda Wolter for
outstanding research assistance.
1 See
ALI Overview, A.L.I., http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=
about.overview (last visited Feb. 22, 2014).
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(the “dependency model”2 and children’s rights) as well as four
analogies available from other areas (laws once applicable to
married women, modern antidiscrimination rules protecting
persons with disabilities, a hypothetical ALI project on LGBT
issues, and the critique of “the law of the horse”). Showing that
none of these templates will permit a systematic approach to
childhood under the law, I propose that the ALI seek to develop a
new vision, guided by clearly expressed normative commitments,
acknowledgement of the competing policies at work, and
consistent organizing principles. As summarized in my brief
conclusion, restating childhood poses conceptual difficulties but
promises enormous rewards.
I.

THE LEGAL CHALLENGE OF CHILDHOOD

The ordinary word “child” denotes an extraordinary
legal category, which in turn makes childhood an exceptional
legal status. Yet, the contours, content, and consequences of
this category all reflect disarray. This section identifies at least
three different origins of such disorder that invite the sort of
clarification, modernization, and improvement of the law that
the ALI claims as its mission.3
First, a welter of different laws, from different sources,
governs children and childhood, as the following examples
reveal. Common law provides doctrines such as a minor’s
ability to disavow a contractual obligation4 and the mature
minor rule, which allows certain minors to consent to medical
treatment (thus immunizing a health care provider from
battery claims).5 In many jurisdictions, state statutes govern
emancipation,6 parentage,7 school attendance,8 child custody,9
and child support.10 Congress too has weighed in on matters
concerning children—sometimes directly, as in enacting the

2 For the source of this term, see Memorandum from Anne Dailey & Laura
Rosenbury on Proposed ALI Project on Children and Law to the ALI Program
Committee (Oct. 14, 2013) (on file with author); see also infra note 122 and
accompanying text.
3 See ALI Overview, supra note 1.
4 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 14 (1981).
5 E.g., Cardwell v. Bechtol, 724 S.W.2d 739, 755 (Tenn. 1987).
6 E.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-108 to 38-109 (2012); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1331 (2013).
7 E.g., CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 7600 et seq. (West 2013).
8 E.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 118.15 (West 2013).
9 E.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 452.375 (2011).
10 E.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.211 (West 2013).

2014]

RESTATING CHILDHOOD

527

Family and Medical Leave Act,11 and often indirectly, by
establishing standards that states must follow to receive federal
funds for programs focused on child support enforcement,12
adoption,13 and child abuse and neglect,14 for example.
The Constitution also pertains to children, according
them certain rights accorded to others, such as equal protection15
and some freedom of expression,16 while recognizing that
children differ from their adult counterparts; these differences,
in turn, justify abortion restrictions for minors that would not be
permissible for adults17 and disallow capital punishment18 and
life sentences19 for young offenders. International conventions,
such as the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of
International Child Abduction20 and the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child,21 provide yet additional
sources of relevant legal principles, whether or not officially
entered into force in this country.22
These multiple sources and the various domains
addressed bring to bear diverging assumptions, normative
commitments, and objectives. For example, some authorities
assume that minors lack mature decisionmaking capacity;
some treat minors as if they have such capacity; and still
others require an individualized assessment of maturity for
each minor. Other values and policies no doubt are at work as
well, probably accounting for some differences in the bottomline treatment of children in, say, the administration of
criminal justice, on one hand, and child custody, on the other.
Yet, even beyond predictable divergences in the conclusions
reached or balances struck across the range of legal contexts,
the underlying premises about children that yield these
responses lack consistency.23

29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(A)–(C) (2011).
E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 666 (2011).
13 E.g., id. §§ 670–71, 673–74.
14 E.g., id. § 5106c.
15 E.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
16 E.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513-14 (1969).
17 Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
18 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).
19 Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2475 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 130 S.
Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010).
20 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction,
Oct. 25, 1980, 1343 U.N.T.S. 49; 42 U.S.C. §§ 11601–11611 (2011).
21 Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S 3.
22 See infra note 123 and accompanying text.
23 See, e.g., SAMUEL M. DAVIS, CHILDREN’S RIGHTS UNDER THE LAW (2011);
Jonathan Todres, Maturity, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 1107, 1145 (2012).
11
12
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This lack of consistency exposes a second problem:
Childhood presents a legal puzzle. Indeed, the clashing premises
all make sense to some degree, frustrating any simplistic
reconciliation. Complicating the puzzle, moreover, law does not
simply govern here; it shapes our understanding of childhood,
children, capacities, and needs.24 This puzzle and its
complications produce a deep theoretical uncertainty.
To illustrate: law identifies children as rights-holders,25
but places the exercise of their rights almost exclusively in
parents’ hands.26 Children’s assumed dependency provides one
primary rationale for this principle,27 but equally consequential is
the constitutional right of parents to control their children’s
upbringing on matters of education,28 visitation,29 and many
aspects of health care.30 In addition, although parents have
affirmative duties toward children, law pursues direct enforcement
against parents only of those duties concerning schooling and
financial support.31 (For other unfulfilled parental obligations, the
state steps in and follows through, as when it removes children
from their homes in neglect cases and places them in foster care or
terminates parental rights.32) As the contexts of schooling and
financial support demonstrate, sometimes state interests trump
parental autonomy, leaving children subordinate to multiple
vertical authorities—all in the name of their vaguely defined

24 See Annette Ruth Appell, Accommodating Childhood, 19 CARDOZO J. L. &
GENDER 715, 736-40 (2013). Indeed, Annette Appell sees the child–adult divide as
essential to liberalism. Id. at 749; see also Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, A World Fit for
Children Is a World Fit for Everyone: Ecogenerism, Feminism, and Vulnerability, 46
HOUS. L. REV. 817, 825 (2009) (noting how available child care and schooling options,
not children’s needs, define the meaning of “early childhood education”).
25 E.g., Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009);
Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984); W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943); see also Anne C. Dailey, Children’s Constitutional Rights, 95 MINN. L. REV.
2099, 2099-2100 (2011).
26 See Laura A. Rosenbury, Between Home and School, 155 U. PA. L. REV.
833, 833-34 (2007); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, “Who Owns the Child?” Meyer and
Pierce and the Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995, 997 (1992).
27 See, e.g., Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993) (“[J]uveniles, unlike
adults, are always in some form of custody.”).
28 E.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
29 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
30 Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
31 See, e.g., Elisa B. v. Superior Ct., 117 P.3d 660 (Cal. 2005) (recognizing
biological mother’s former partner as children’s second mother with child support
duties); State v. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d 200 (Wis.) (upholding as a condition of defendant’s
probation a requirement that he father no more children unless he can support them),
reconsideration denied & opinion clarified, 635 N.W.2d 760 (Wis. 2001).
32 See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
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best interests.33 In turn, children’s present lives and
preferences receive diminished respect in presumed service not
only to parental prerogatives but also to the children’s future
role as full adult citizens.34
What is missing is a coherent vision that takes into
account across a range of topics the important tensions that
surface in the different sources of law and underlie the puzzle—
such as dependency and maturity, agency and relationships
(both within and outside families), rights and responsibilities
(not only of children but also of adults and institutions affecting
children’s lives), and children’s experiences and interests
(present as well as future). And, of course, despite the
transsubstantive objectives, values and policies specific to given
areas of law must enter the analysis when relevant.
A third problem stems from a growing body of scientific
and social scientific information that has enhanced and
complicated our understanding of childhood, with legal
authorities beginning to take note. For example, new learning
from neuroscience and behavioral psychology has made
adolescent brain development an important element in three
recent Eighth Amendment cases in which the Supreme Court
held unconstitutional the imposition on juvenile offenders of adult
penalties, specifically capital punishment and life sentences
without parole.35 In each case, the Court invoked such learning to
emphasize “the reduced culpability of juveniles because of their
developmental immaturity, pointing to adolescents’ diminished
decision-making capacity, their vulnerability to external pressures
(including peer pressure), and their unformed characters.”36 Even
though assumptions about developmental immaturity undergird

33 This standard, invoked routinely in child custody disputes, also surfaces in
other contexts, including emancipation, adoption, and placement after adjudications of
abuse and neglect. For the classic critique of this standard, see Robert H. Mnookin,
Child Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, 39 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 226 (1975); see also Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Emery, Gender
Politics and Child Custody: The Puzzling Persistence of the Best Interest Standard, 77
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming 2014).
34 See Dailey & Rosenbury, supra note 2, at 18-20; Memorandum for ALI
Invitational Conference, Laura Rosenbury & Anne C. Dailey, Children and Law:
Overview of Possible Topics for an ALI Project (Aug. 27, 2012) (on file with author); see
also Appell, supra note 24, at 722-24.
35 Supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text. See, e.g., Richard J. Bonnie &
Elizabeth S. Scott, The Teenage Brain: Adolescent Brain Research and the Law, 22
CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCH. SCIENCE 158 (2013).
36 Bonnie & Scott, supra note 35, at 160.
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many legal distinctions between children and adults,37 the
implications of neuroscientific and developmental research for
issues other than criminal punishment have not been fully
explored.38 This is a task that could be undertaken as part of a
broader effort to bring coherence to the legal conceptualization of
childhood and the legal treatment of children.
II.

ENTER THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE

The law pertinent to the legal category of child certainly
needs clarification, modernization, and improvement. And
surely these are the routinely stated objectives of ALI work.39
Yet, determining whether an ALI project would provide an
appropriate apparatus, whether the ALI process would make a
significant contribution to realization of the goal, and even
whether the challenges of coherent reconceptualization can be
met all require closer consideration.
A.

ALI Projects and Products
1. The Work of ALI at 90

Now starting its tenth decade, the ALI has ventured
beyond its foundational and familiar work in areas such as torts40
both to carve out and tackle new fields, such as American Indian
law, election law, and government ethics.41 These fledgling
projects present special difficulties for achieving the ALI’s
traditional objectives. For example, while the successive torts
projects42 have had as their core the distillation of state common
law developments, American Indian Law must clear a path
37 See, e.g., Larry Cunningham, A Question of Capacity: Towards a
Comprehensive and Consistent Vision of Children and Their Status Under Law, 10
U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. & POL’Y 275, 285 (2006); Todres, supra note 23.
38 E.g., Laurence Steinberg et al., Are Adolescents Less Mature Than Adults?:
Minors’ Access to Abortion, the Juvenile Death Penalty, and the Alleged APA “Flip
Flop”, 64 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 583, 592 (2009). But see generally Emily Buss, What the
Law Should (and Should Not) Learn from Child Development Research, 38 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 13 (2009) (noting the limitations of using scientific findings, including those from
neuroscience, to resolve legal issues).
39 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
40 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS (1934); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS (1979).
41 See ALI Overview, supra note 1.
42 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND
EMOTIONAL HARM (2010 & 2012); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF
LIABILITY (2000); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY (1998); supra
note 40 and accompanying text.
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through a more uneven terrain that includes the United States
Constitution, Indian treaties, federal statutes and case law, tribal
authorities, and sometimes state law.43 In the meantime, Election
Law sets out to develop a model calendar and procedures for
resolving disputed presidential elections,44 while Government
Ethics will likely take the form of a set of best practices.45
Although these projects might seem to stretch beyond
the ALI’s established approach, the Institute over the years has
often confronted the discord between “clarifying” existing law,
on one hand, and “modernizing” and “improving” it, on the
other. As Wisconsin Chief Justice Shirley Abrahamson, asked:
“Is [ALI] a ‘restater’ of the law as it is, or an agent of law
reform?”46 She invokes ALI lore about a bird that flies forward as
well as backward to make the point that the ALI is both.47 And,
indeed, some of the ALI’s guiding principles—long emblazoned on
the walls at the Institute’s conference center under the heading
“On Restatements and Legal Change”—have come from a pair
of statements by former Director Herbert Wechsler that
demonstrate how the enterprise entails much more than a
recitation of some majority view:
[W]e should feel obliged in our deliberations to give weight to all of
the considerations that the courts, under a proper view of the
judicial function, deem it right to weigh in theirs.48
In judging what was “right”, a preponderating balance of
authority would normally be given weight, as it no doubt would

43 See Memorandum from Matthew Fletcher to Discussion Participants at the
American Law Institute on American Indian Law (Mar. 29, 2012) (on file with author);
see also RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW THIRD: THE LAW OF AMERICAN INDIANS, (Discussion
Draft Apr. 11, 2013), available at http://extranet.ali.org/docs/LAI_DD_online.pdf.
44 See Principles of Election Law: Resolution of Election Disputes, Report to
ALI, Apr. 16, 2012, available at http://www.ali.org/00021333/Election_Law__
report%20-%20online.pdf.
45 See
Current Projects, A.L.I., http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=
projects.proj_ip&projectid=22; Principles of Government Ethics, Reporters’
Memorandum No. 3, Nov. 23, 2011, available at http://extranet.ali.org/docs/2011%20%20November%20-%20PGE%20RM%203%20-%20online.pdf.
46 Shirley S. Abrahamson, Refreshing Institutional Memories: Wisconsin and
the American Law Institute, the Fairchild Lecture, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 1, 7.
47 See id.
48 Herbert Weshler, Report of the Director, 1967 A.L.I. ANN. REP., 1, 5 (1967)
(as quoted on the wall of the Wolkin Conference Center, American Law Institute,
Philadelphia, PA). In the original report, the full sentence reads: “I pointed out that the
official statements in our records always have affirmed some scope for such a judgment
and suggested as a working formula that we should feel obliged in our deliberations to
give weight to all of the considerations that the courts, under a proper view of the
judicial function, deem it right to weigh in theirs.”
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generally weigh with courts, but it has not been thought to be
conclusive.49

Modern day Restatements reflect an appreciation of the
complexity and uncertainty of law,50 even though, as formally
described, they provide “‘clear formulations of common law and
its statutory elements or variations,’ reflecting ‘the law as it
presently stands or as it might plausibly be stated by a court.’”51
Further, notwithstanding the ample space that contemporary
Restatements allow for creative approaches, normative positions,
and nuance, the development of alternative formats increases
ALI’s flexibility to take on varied topics. For example, work
designated as “Principles,” including the Principles of the Law of
Family Dissolution52 and new projects on election law and
government ethics, is explicitly aspirational because it “assume[s]
the stance of expressing the law as it should be, which may or
may not reflect the law as it is.”53 “Legislative Recommendations,”
which usually take the form of a model statute, such as the now
classic Model Penal Code,54 provide still additional
opportunities to improve upon existing law.55 Although I
imagine a Restatement project devoted to children, I would not
foreclose use of one of the other forms.
As this summary suggests, the ALI’s diverse portfolio
should easily accommodate work that focuses on children,
including their legal status and rights, their decisionmaking,
their relationships with others, and the obligations and duties
owed to them. True, a project on children must consider many
different sources, but so must American Indian Law, for
example. To the extent that work on children must try to find
or develop coherence amid disarray and must consider new
learning from other disciplines, two earlier ALI projects stand
49 Herbert Weshler, Report of the Director, 1966 A.L.I. ANN. REP. 1,6 (1966)
(as quoted on the wall of the Wolkin Conference Center, American Law Institute,
Philadelphia, PA).
50 G. Edward White, Speech at Luncheon Honoring New Life (25-year) and
New 50-year Members, ALI Annual Meeting (May 21, 2013) (transcript forthcoming),
available at http://2013am.ali.org/2013-am-booklet.pdf.
51 G. Edward White, From the Second Restatements to the Present: The ALI’s
Recent History and Current Challenges, 16 GREEN BAG 2D 305, 312 (2013) (quoting
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, CAPTURING THE VOICE OF THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE
(2005 handbook)).
52 AMERICAN
LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY
DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2002) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES OF
FAMILY DISSOLUTION].
53 See White, supra note 51, at 312.
54 MODEL PENAL CODE (Official Draft 1985); see infra notes 68-71 and
accompanying text.
55 See White, supra note 51, at 312.
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out as especially illuminating guideposts, although neither is
labeled a “Restatement.”
2. Two Guideposts
a. The Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution
For obvious reasons, a project on children would look to
the Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution,56 which devoted
some attention to children, specifically their residence,57
relationships,58 and economic support59 in the specific context of
parental divorce or the end of a domestic partnership. Even apart
from such topical convergences, however, the Principles of the
Law of Family Dissolution, published in 2002, provide a useful
prototype because they brought a conceptual coherence to an
undertheorized and unruly tangle of family laws. Three
particular features of the Principles should prove instructive in
an effort to develop a more systematic approach to laws
governing children and childhood.
First, a distinct premise animates the Principles and
makes clear the project’s objectives: enhancing predictability on
matters historically committed to indeterminate standards and
judicial discretion. By making likely outcomes in court more
predictable, the Principles seek to promote party agreement and
settlement.60 To accomplish this end, the Principles propound
default rules for which courts must articulate reasons for
departures and from which parties must affirmatively choose to
opt out.61 A clear premise designed to advance specific objectives
would likewise serve as a valuable unifying tool for a project
centered on the legal category of child.
Second, the Principles set out certain normative
commitments, including some that were emerging but not yet
fully approved by other legal authorities. Thus, the Principles
reject not only discrimination based on race and sex62 but also
discrimination based on sexual orientation.63 Here, the ALI was
PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, supra note 52.
See id. at 91-408 (Chapter 2 on “The Allocation of Custodial and
Decisionmaking Responsibility for Children”).
58 See id. § 2.02 (making continuity of existing parent-child attachments an
objective to facilitate in serving the child’s best interests); id. § 2.03(c) (recognizing “de facto
parents” based on co-residence with child and performance of caretaking functions).
59 See id. at 409-644 (Chapter 3 on “Child Support”).
60 See id. § 1.01 cmt. a.
61 See id. §§ 1.01-1.02.
62 See id. § 2.12(1)(a)–(b).
63 See id. § 2.12(1)(d).
56
57
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ahead of its time, assimilating same-sex couples to their crosssex counterparts64 as long as the relationship meets specific
criteria65 and doing so before any U.S. jurisdiction permitted
same-sex marriage.66 The law governing children is riddled
with often unexamined normative assumptions, so a readiness
to stake out expressly one or more values that shape the project
would promote clarification and coherence.
Third, the Principles embrace an openness—albeit
limited—to departures from traditional constructs, for
example, defining “family” in functional (not just formal) terms
through such moves as recognition of de facto parents and
parents by estoppel.67 Given the dilemma of dependency and
the tendency to subordinate children’s interests to parental
rights, openness to new understandings is essential for
modernizing and improving the law.
b. The Model Penal Code
The Model Penal Code (MPC), officially adopted by the
Institute in 1962,68 remains one of the ALI’s signature projects.
The Code proved enormously influential in law reform
throughout the United States, and it continues to occupy a
central place in criminal law casebooks and hornbooks.69 This
project’s success tends to obscure earlier growing pains,
revealed in Herbert Wechsler’s 1952 article, The Challenge of a
Model Penal Code, which urged the ALI to move forward on the
See, e.g., id. § 4.03(6).
See, e.g., id. § 6.03.
66 Massachusetts, the first U.S. state to legalize marriage for same-sex
couples, did so after judicial decisions in 2003 and 2004. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub.
Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003); In re Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802
N.E.2d 565 (Mass. 2004).
67 See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, supra note 52, § 2.03(b)–(c).
68 MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 54.
69 Even those who have expressed disapproval of specific elements concede
the stature and influence of the project:
64
65

Four decades after its completion, the American Law Institute’s Model Penal
Code remains a singular landmark of doctrinal rigor and conceptual clarity in
its statement of the major elements of the substantive criminal law. Herbert
Wechsler’s mastery of the elements of offenses and the proper contours of
defenses remains a mainstay in the criminal law classroom and a standard
against which less-accomplished real-world statutes can be measured. The
Code has had major influence in several states, but for the most part it
remains more a model than a standard form of codification of the substantive
criminal law.
Franklin E. Zimring, The Unexamined Death Penalty: Capital Punishment and Reform
of the Model Penal Code, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1396, 1397 (2005).
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MPC proposal that had languished for 20 years as “unfinished
business” on the Institute’s agenda.70 Wechsler would later
serve as Reporter for the MPC and then become the Institute’s
third Director.71
Wechsler’s article catalogues several pressing reasons
why the ALI should proceed with the proposal, including “the
lack of comprehensive treatment of penal law,”72 “substantive
defects,”73 “domination by administration,”74 and “psychological
and scientific criticism.”75 Although the ALI has been considering
work on children only recently, thanks to a grassroots effort by
some Institute members,76 the reasons cited by Wechsler for
moving forward on his project apply to this field as well. As
already noted, comprehensive examination is missing; law’s
treatment of children is riddled with contradictions and
unsubstantiated assumptions; and the haphazard influence of
scientific developments has invited criticism. In addition, some
legal matters concerning children, most notably child custody77
and abuse and neglect proceedings,78 manifest considerable
administrative overlay.
In identifying as an important issue the extent to which
rehabilitation ought to be a major objective of criminal law,
Wechsler cited the rehabilitation-centered “theory of the juvenile
court and youth offender laws.”79 Of course, today rehabilitation
has fallen so out of favor that even many young offenders are now
tried as adults and receive adult sentences.80 Indeed, the
contemporary willingness to depart from this theory has sparked
the recognition by the Supreme Court of constitutional limits on
criminal punishment for youth.81 Thus, the erosion of Wechsler’s
70 Herbert Wechsler, The Challenge of a Model Penal Code, 65 HARV. L. REV.
1097, 1097 (1952).
71 See
ALI Overview, supra note 1; Officers & Council, A.L.I.,
https://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=about.officers (last visited Feb. 22, 2014).
72 Wechsler, supra note 70, at 1098.
73 Id. at 1100.
74 Id. at 1101.
75 Id. at 1102.
76 Several new members of the Institute asked for consideration of this idea
at the Annual Meeting of 2011 in San Francisco, CA. Conversations have continued
periodically, and the ALI hosted an invitational conference to discuss the idea in
September, 2012. See Rosenbury & Dailey, supra note 34. Subsequently, at the request
of the Program Committee, a proposal was prepared and submitted. See Dailey &
Rosenbury, supra note 2.
77 See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, supra note 52, § 2.02(1)(f);
Mnookin, supra note 33.
78 E.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
79 Wechsler, supra note 70, at 1104.
80 See, e.g., Bonnie & Scott, supra note 35, at 159-60.
81 See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
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own premises for work on model criminal legislation now helps
to make the case for a project on children and youth.
In any event, the ALI took up Wechsler’s challenge,
grappling with the difficulties he named as well as those that
have surfaced more recently—whether in the Institute’s recent
stand against capital punishment,82 in an ongoing project on
sentencing that attempts to respond to the collapse of the
rehabilitative ideal,83 or in work designed to revisit the MPC’s
chapter on sexual assault.84 That the MPC became the catalyst
for wide-ranging criminal law reform and remains a vital force
demonstrates the important contribution that the ALI can
make when it brings its process to bear on an area of law in
need of comprehensive, multidisciplinary, and normative
examination. The legal category of “child” stands out as an area
in need of precisely this type of analysis.
B.

ALI Process

ALI’s inclusive and rigorous process brings together
legal academics, practicing attorneys, and judges. Although
legal scholars shoulder the initial drafting responsibilities,
typically conceptualizing and organizing the project, others
contribute as advisers and participants in members consultative
groups.85 Advisers may include non-lawyers with valuable
expertise from other disciplines for a given project. For example,
two scholars without law degrees who had conducted relevant
empirical research participated as advisers for the Principles of
the Law of Family Dissolution,86 while the advisers for the
sentencing project include the Deputy Director for the Office of
Policy and Offender Reentry of the Ohio Department of
Rehabilitation and Correction, who has a PhD but not a JD.87

82 See
Current Projects, A.L.I., http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=
projects.proj_ip&projectid=2 (reporting action of the Council, Oct. 23, 2009) (last visited
Oct. 1, 2013).
83 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING (Discussion Draft No. 5, Apr. 18,
2013), available at http://extranet.ali.org/docs/MPC%20Sentencing%20DD%20No%205_
Online_2.pdf.
84 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE: SEXUAL ASSAULT AND RELATED OFFENSES
(Discussion Draft, Apr. 22, 2013), available at http://extranet.ali.org/13drafts/
MPC%20Sexual%20Assault%20_DD_online.pdf.
85 See
ALI Overview, supra note 1; How ALI Works, A.L.I.,
http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=about.instituteworks (last visited Oct. 1, 2013).
86 See PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, supra note 52, at vii-viii (listing
Jessica Pearson and Lenore Weitzman).
87 See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING v-vi (Discussion Draft No. 5, Apr. 18,
2013), available at http://extranet.ali.org/docs/MPC%20Sentencing%20DD%20No%205_
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Even after such groups of experts weigh in, the Council and
Institute’s general membership have the opportunity to offer
suggestions and ultimately to vote work up or down.88 Only
with an affirmative vote of both the Council and the general
membership can a draft become an official ALI product.89
This uniquely multilayered process should prove
especially valuable for work on children and law. Judges who
confront children in court will likely have a different
perspective from those of scholars who theorize about children,
lawyers who represent children, or lawyers who work with
their parents. The sprawling expanse of laws touching children
requires consulting a variety of experts because those who
focus on, for example, child custody cases will bring something
to the enterprise that those with experience in juvenile justice
cases cannot contribute and vice versa. The relevance of
learning from the sciences and social sciences might well call
for the inclusion of experts from these disciplines. If the law
governing children is to be clarified, modernized, and improved,
then it is difficult to imagine a methodology more promising
than that offered by the ALI.
C.

The Search for Coherent Reconceptualization

No matter how fitting the forum and how illuminating
the process, ALI work on children is worth pursuing only if the
aimed-for coherence can be achieved. To “ask the child question”90
expansively and to develop an answer that responds to the diffuse
and inconsistent regulation of children constitute daunting
assignments. For good reason, the Supreme Court has explicitly
disclaimed the opportunity to consider “the totality of the
relationship of the minor and the State.”91 Going forward on
this topic requires a vision of what the law should say about
children, with due attention to scope and organization.
As I imagine it, an ALI project might identify those
aspects of existing law that reflect the desired normative
choices. These aspects in turn could reveal the scaffolding for
new approaches in areas where the current regime seems
normatively misguided or otherwise out of joint. On the other
Online_2.pdf (listing Edward E. Rhine, PhD, Deputy Director for the Office of Policy
and Offender Reentry of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction).
88 See ALI Overview, supra note 1; How ALI Works, supra note 85.
89 See How ALI Works, supra note 85.
90 See Woodhouse, supra note 24, at 821 (internal quotations omitted).
91 Ginsburg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 636 (1968).
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hand, inconsistencies might remain, but with an explanation
for the differences provided. For example, the scaffolding might
rest on foundational considerations of maturity or capacity;92 if
and when such considerations are not determinative, however,
then the countervailing policies would be made explicit. I have
described just one possibility, however, and the prospect of a
project on children is exciting precisely because of the need to
work out a basic theory to undergird the analysis and to serve
as a touchstone in the resolution of doctrinal tensions.
In terms of scope, any laws specifically aimed at
children, their presumed interests and needs, and their special
legal status would seem well-suited for inclusion. Beyond
these, however, countless laws on countless subjects pertain, or
potentially pertain, to children—whether through direct
application to all persons or through an explicit or implicit
exemption for children, for example, the infancy defense in the
law of contracts. Selectivity is essential because too
comprehensive an initiative might take too long, become
unwieldy, or even defeat the objective of coherent
reconceptualization. Yet, an overly narrow project on children
could stunt the ability to tease out unifying themes and the best
way to rationalize or harmonize inconsistencies.93 Between an
initiative that is too large and one that is too small, what
choices will make the scope “just right”?
Decisions about vision and scope will drive the
development of an organizational scheme—how to present and
order the issues to be addressed.94 Returning to the Principles
of the Law of Family Dissolution as a guide, one can view
existing law favoring parties’ resolution of their own disputes
(embodied in the cases and statutes on prenuptial95 and
92 See, e.g., Cunningham, supra note 37; Todres, supra note 23; see also
Hillary Rodham, Children Under the Law, 43 HARV. EDUC. REV. 487, 507 (1973)
(advocating “abolition of the general status of minority and adoption of an area-by-area
approach (as has already been done . . . in the motor vehicle statutes)”).
93 For example, an ALI project on child sexual abuse and the issues it raises,
including statutes of limitations, evidentiary problems, and institutional liability, as
proposed by one contribution to this symposium, might have much to offer. See Marci
A. Hamilton, The Time Has Come for a Restatement of Child Sex Abuse, 79 BROOK. L.
REV. 397 (2014). Nonetheless, the scope of a project on this topic, although relevant to
children, would neither permit a systematic review of the legal category of child nor
provide an opportunity to grapple with cross-cutting themes and inconsistencies.
94 One possible way to organize the analysis would break it into three parts:
relationships, responsibilities, and rights; then, within each of these parts, the
examination would proceed to consider topics pertinent first to parents, then the state,
and finally children. See generally Dailey & Rosenbury, supra note 2 (outlining
organizational structure for a table of contents).
95 E.g., Simeone v. Simeone, 581 A.2d 162 (Pa. 1990).
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separation agreements96) as the scaffolding that supports a
more thoroughgoing system centered on private ordering,97
with mechanisms for rebutting presumptions,98 opting out,99 or
accessing other escape valves when needed.100 The Principles’
scope encompasses issues that arise out of family dissolution,101
although there is no provision on “grounds” for dissolution despite
a clearly expressed normative commitment to a no-fault approach
to all issues.102 Topics covered by the Principles are organized in a
logical manner, with a few notable features. For example, the
placement of child custody and child support before other issues
can be read as a normative statement about priorities,103 and the
unified consideration of premarital, marital, and separation
agreements highlights the commonalities and contrasts.104
I leave to those who will serve as Reporters for a project
on children the formidable responsibility of proposing for their
work a suitable vision, scaffolding, and scope, along with
organizing principles.105 Even if the project cannot reconcile all
the existing inconsistencies in how law treats children and clean
up all the current disarray, it could accomplish much by making
the underlying policies explicit and providing standards for
resolving any conflicts among these policies, thus developing a
framework that integrates competing considerations and values.
Distinguishing easy matters, or those that existing law addresses
coherently, from more challenging problems, with a rubric for
E.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 452.325 (2013).
See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
98 E.g.,
PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, supra note 52, § 5.04
(calculation of compensatory spousal payments).
99 E.g., id. § 4.12(4).
100 See id. § 1.02.
101 Some of the matters covered have relevance outside of dissolution, for
example, the recognition of parents by estoppel and de facto parents. See supra note 67
and accompanying text.
102 See generally PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, supra note 52, chapters
4-5; see also Peter Nash Swisher, Reassessing Fault Factors in No-Fault Divorce, 31
FAM. L.Q. 269, 274-75 (1997–1998) (“[T]he American Law Institute recently adopted a
number of the proposed Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, which argue for
the total abolition of all fault-based factors of marital dissolution or divorce.”).
103 See PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, supra note 52, at xxiii-l (table of
contents). By contrast, for example, the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act’s provisions
on property division (§ 307) and maintenance (§ 308) precede those on child support
(§ 309) and child custody (§§ 401-410). UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT, available at
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/Marriage%20and%20Divorce%20Act/UMDA%
201973.pdf. Cf. Rosalind Dixon & Martha C. Nussbaum, Children’s Rights and a
Capabilities Approach: The Question of Special Priority, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 549, 56583 (2012) (examining the case for according special priority to children).
104 See PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, supra note 52, at 945-1032
(Chapter 7 on “Agreements”).
105 For one preliminary “take,” see Dailey & Rosenbury, supra note 2.
96
97
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approaching the latter, would also constitute an important
contribution. Expressed in the familiar words of the ALI’s
mission, the project will succeed to the extent that it can
clarify, modernize, and improve the legal treatment of children
and childhood. In anticipation of such efforts, however, I explain
how certain frameworks, although providing tempting points of
departure, would produce false starts and thus ought to be
rejected at the outset.
1. Familiar but Deficient Frames
Two familiar frames claim to resolve the puzzle of
childhood under the law—though in fact they help create this
puzzle. Family law’s conventional frame emphasizes parental
authority first and state authority next.106 Many justify this
model by citing children’s dependency, the “natural affection”
that parents have for their children,107 the pluralism that such
family autonomy allows,108 and the quid pro quo parents receive
in return for supporting their children,109 thus relieving the
state of that burden.110 The state steps in under limited
circumstances of parental default.111 Often, the question posed is
whether parents or the state can best speak for the child in a
particular context,112 with the rationale that such adult
authorities safeguard the development of children into future
citizens who then will have the capacity to make their own
choices.113 A reflexive effort to “restate” the law governing children
would probably use this traditional dependency model.114

See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
E.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979).
108 See, e.g., Peggy Cooper Davis, Contested Images of Family Values: The Role
of the State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1348 (1994); William A. Galston, The Legal and
Political Implications of Moral Pluralism, 57 MD. L. REV. 236, 236-38 (1998).
109 See, e.g., Anne L. Alstott, Is the Family at Odds with Equality?: The Legal
Implications of Equality for Children, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (2008); Katharine T.
Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE L.J. 293, 297-98 (1988); see also, e.g.,
Scott Altman, A Theory of Child Support, 17 INT’L J. L. POL’Y & FAM. 173 (2003); Ira
Mark Ellman & Tara O’Toole Ellman, The Theory of Child Support, 45 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 107 (2008).
110 E.g., Elisa B. v. Superior Ct., 117 P.3d 660, 669 (Cal. 2005); Anne Alstott,
Private Tragedies?: Family Law as Social Insurance, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 3 (2010).
111 See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
112 E.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 241-46 (1972) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting in part). Compare MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, WHAT’S WRONG WITH CHILDREN’S
RIGHTS (2005), with Emily Buss, What Does Frieda Yoder Believe?, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 53
(1999); see also, e.g., Rosenbury, supra note 26, at 833-34; Woodhouse, supra note 26, at 997.
113 See, e.g., Appell, supra note 24, at 736-37; Dailey, supra note 25, at 2113.
114 See Dailey & Rosenbury, supra note 2, at 4-5.
106
107
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A competing frame, based on children’s rights,115 would
evoke familiar references that pervade all “rights talk.”116
Exemplified in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of
the Child (UNCRC),117 this frame rejects the treatment of
children as “property” of their parents118 and often includes a
list of specific entitlements for children.119
Neither of these familiar models, however, is up to the
task required for an ALI Restatement (or Principles) project on
children. The first, the traditional approach, expressly
marginalizes children and their experiences in the here and
now; it treats their dependency as an all-defining characteristic
and equates it with incapacity.120 Further, it emphasizes parental
authority or state control over children at the expense of the
responsibilities of parents and the state. In celebrating vertical
relationships, it ignores children’s horizontal relationships, such
as those with peers and siblings.121 Accordingly, this dependency
model122 cannot effectively address important cross-currents
and does little to “improve” the law.
The second, the children’s rights approach, would probably
be a nonstarter politically here in the U.S., one of only two United
Nations countries that have refused to adopt the UNCRC because
of perceived threats to parental supremacy.123 Moreover,
translated into U.S. rights discourse, this approach might unduly
115 See generally DAVIS, supra note 23; JOANNA L. GROSSMAN & LAWRENCE M.
FRIEDMAN, INSIDE THE CASTLE: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN 20TH CENTURY AMERICA 27985 (2011) (discussing the rise of “children’s rights” in twentieth century family law).
116 See generally MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF
POLITICAL DISCOURSE (1991).
117 Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3.
118 See Woodhouse, supra note 26.
119 E.g., Convention on the Rights of the Child, Art. 7 § 1, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577
U.N.T.S. 3. (“The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the
right from birth to a name, the right to acquire a nationality and, as far as possible, the
right to know and be cared for by his or her parents.”); id. Art. 17 (“States Parties
recognize the important function performed by the mass media and shall ensure that
the child has access to information and material from a diversity of national and
international sources, especially those aimed at the promotion of his or her social,
spiritual and moral well-being and physical and mental health.”); id. Art. 27 § 1
(“States Parties recognize the right of every child to a standard of living adequate for
the child’s physical, mental, spiritual, moral and social development.”); see also Dixon
& Nussbaum, supra note 103, at 558 n.37 (listing threshold entitlements under
Nussbaum’s capabilities approach).
120 See Appell, supra note 24, at 721, 771-72.
121 See, e.g., Jill Elaine Hasday, Siblings in Law, 65 VAND. L. REV. 897, 899
(2012); Rosenbury, supra note 26.
122 See Dailey & Rosenbury, supra note 2, at 7.
123 See GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 115, at 280; see also, e.g., Senate
Proceedings on the Hague Convention on International Recovery of Child Support and
Family Maintenance, Sept. 29, 2010 (emphasizing commitment to parental rights and
reaffirming U.S. nonratification of CRC).
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elevate autonomy claims over other important interests, including
children’s relational interests. Although the UNCRC includes
responsibilities to children and relational interests,124 the
reluctance to recognize positive rights more generally in the
U.S.125 provides one more reason why this approach would face
forceful headwinds here. In addition, the history of some of the
UNCRC’s listed rights invites skepticism about the weight
accorded to the interests of children versus those of others,126
particularly parents.
Moreover, even to the extent that each of these familiar
frames has elements worth incorporating in a new approach,
the project must face intractable conflict. Consider, for example,
the permissibility of corporal punishment. The traditional
approach allows reasonable physical discipline of a child by
parents127 or the state.128 The children’s rights approach
emphasizes the negative right to be free from such harm and
might well use the standard applicable to adults, under which
any unwanted touching constitutes a battery.129 The inadequacy
of each of these familiar frames alone and their irreconcilable
premises call for a new understanding.
2. Tempting but Unsatisfying Analogies
a. Children and Married Women
One new understanding might emphasize how legal
treatment of children parallels the way law once treated
married women, in each case making a social construction appear

124 See supra note 119 (citing examples). Cf. Appell, supra note 24, at 732;
Dixon & Nussbaum, supra note 103, at 553.
125 See, e.g., Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005); DeShaney
v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
126 See RITA ARDITTI, SEARCHING FOR LIFE: THE GRANDMOTHERS OF THE PLAZA
DE MAYO AND THE DISAPPEARED CHILDREN OF ARGENTINA 145-51 (1999) (documenting
how parents of those “disappeared” during Argentina’s “dirty war” fought to recover
their grandchildren, achieving the incorporation of a child’s “right to identity” in Article
8 of the UNCRC). I am grateful to Barbara Stark for acquainting me with this history.
127 See, e.g., State v. Lefevre, 117 P.3d 980 (N.M. 2005); CAL. WELF. & INST.
CODE § 300(a) (West 2013); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 844 (West 2013).
128 See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (upholding corporal
punishment by Florida schools).
129 Convention on the Rights of the Child, Arts. 19 & 37, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577
U.N.T.S. 3, 19, 37. See Barbara Stark, Rhetoric, Religion, and International Human
Rights: “Save the Children!”, in WHAT IS RIGHT FOR CHILDREN?: THE COMPETING
PARADIGMS OF RELIGION AND HUMAN RIGHTS 46, 49-50 (Martha Fineman & Karen
Worthington eds., 2009). Indeed, laws developed for adult abuse (domestic violence)
might apply to the parental use of physical force to discipline.
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natural and inevitable.130 Just as those who occupy the legal
category of “child” today, married women were once considered
necessarily dependent, lacking legal capacity to make important
choices such as domicile131 or binding contractual responsibility.132
The parent-child relationship, just like the marital relationship
once did, subsumes the identity and autonomy of one member of
the family in the authority of another.
Feminist legal theorists, most notably Martha Fineman133
and Jennifer Nedelsky,134 emphasize how dependency is
universal,135 despite the celebration of autonomy in traditional
liberalism. Thus, for example, Nedelsky makes the case for a
relational understanding of autonomy, situated in an
appreciation for our collective interdependence.136 Although
Nedelsky has matters of gender in her sights, she invokes the
child as the classic illustration of dependency.137 Viewed
through this lens, we might well see an opportunity to deploy
legal changes in the treatment of married women—including
the rise of formal gender equality138—as a template for a new
approach to children and law.
Certainly, there are many useful insights for work on
children that might come from such sources, including notions
of pervasive dependency,139 relational autonomy, collective
interdependence,140 and childhood as a socially and legally
constructed status.141 Nonetheless, we cannot seamlessly apply
to children what we have learned about married women.
Despite variations in the capacities of each individual woman
(and man), differences between infants and adolescents stand
130 See Dailey & Rosenbury, supra note 2, at 3; see also Appell, supra note 24, at
737 (noting how “the child question is quite similar to the woman, race, and sexual minority
questions—the topics of feminist jurisprudence, critical race theory, and queer theory”).
131 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 27 (1934).
132 E.g., Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873).
133 E.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF
DEPENDENCY 31-54 (2004); Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject:
Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition, 20 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 1 (2008).
134 See JENNIFER NEDELSKY, LAW’S RELATIONS: A RELATIONAL THEORY OF
SELF, AUTONOMY, AND LAW (2011).
135 See Dixon & Nussbaum, supra note 103, at 574 (noting how “many forms of
vulnerability experienced by children are common to others”).
136 NEDELSKY, supra note 134, at 27-28.
137 See id. at 19-30, 39.
138 See, e.g., Cary Franklin, The Anti-Stereotyping Principle in Constitutional
Sex Discrimination Law, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 83 (2010).
139 See Woodhouse, supra note 24, at 818-24 (expressing such ideas in a theory
of “ecogenerism”).
140 See generally NEDELSKY, supra note 134.
141 See Woodhouse, supra note 24, at 819-20 (noting the frequent absorption of
“children’s issues” in “women’s issues”).
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out as something more than a legal or cultural artifact, even if
the generalizations vary from one context to another. Taking
into account the developmental arc, without seeing children
simply as future adults or making each developmental stage a
self-fulfilling prophecy, emerges as an especially challenging
aspect of work that takes seriously children themselves in the
here and now.142 Thus, undue reliance on the analogy of
married women would marginalize or even exclude some of the
special considerations that a project on children must confront.
b. Children and Individuals with Disabilities
Another analogy with apparent traction is the
contemporary legal treatment of persons with disabilities, as
reflected in the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)143 and
specifically its antidiscrimination principle and its reasonable
accommodation requirement.144 These provisions work together
to treat as discrimination the failure to provide reasonable
accommodation needed for a qualified individual with a disability
to perform a job (with “qualified individual” defined as “an
individual who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can
perform the essential functions of the employment position that
such individual holds or desires”145).146 Thus, the ADA not only
disallows discrimination that might be considered “rational;” it
also requires affirmative departures from the workplace status
quo to enable the individual with disabilities to obtain or retain a
job.147 Moreover, the ADA treats as discrimination the failure to
make accessible to those with disabilities public transportation
services148 and many public accommodations and commercial
facilities.149 Accordingly, the ADA challenges our society’s
background “givens” and norms to the extent they privilege the
able-bodied to the detriment of those with disabilities.
Perhaps this way of thinking offers a rubric for
reconceptualizing childhood.150 Although children lack certain
capacities,151 they are often able “with or without reasonable
See Dailey & Rosenbury, supra note 2, at 18-20.
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101(a)–(b) (2011).
144 Id. §§ 12112(a), 12112(b)(5).
145 Id. § 12111(8).
146 See Samuel R. Bagenstos, “Rational Discrimination,” Accommodation, and
the Politics of (Disability) Civil Rights, 89 VA. L. REV. 825 (2003).
147 See id.
148 42 U.S.C. § 12184.
149 Id. § 12183.
150 See Appell, supra note 24.
151 See Dixon & Nussbaum, supra note 103.
142
143
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accommodation [to] perform the essential functions” required
by adult freedoms and responsibilities. Excluding children from
certain important choices, opportunities, relationships, and
responsibilities based on crude age-based classifications reflects a
form of discrimination (even if “rational”), when a more nuanced
analysis incorporating accommodation would better achieve the
important value of equality.152 Accommodation, at least in the
employment context, typically requires an individualized
assessment, which might help make the distinctions necessary
between, say, an infant and an adolescent or even two thirteenyear-olds in certain contexts. In addition, this approach invites us
to question background rules that maintain and accentuate the
dependency of children.153
Annette Appell has advocated this approach, proposing a
constitutional “Children’s Participation Amendment” (CPA).154 As
she explains: “The CPA promotes inclusion by removing barriers
to, and providing assistance for, children’s integration into civic
life and their independence in their own lives.”155 Although Appell
would not displace the private family,156 she would certainly limit
its authority157 through the development of principles designed
to enhance children’s agency,158 for example, presuming
children to be competent159 and recognizing rights beyond the
canonical negative liberties.160
Although tempting as an analogy and offering some
promising insights, the disability/accommodation frame cannot
alone provide a foundation for ALI work on children. First, in
recounting what the idea would mean in practice, Appell paints
a picture that would make the UNCRC, already politically
controversial because of its allegedly radical challenge to
parental rights,161 seem conservative and mainstream. True,
Appell’s proposed CPA offers a valuable thought experiment,
highlighting how the current regime fails to respect children—
Appell prefers liberty over equality. See Appell, supra note 24, at 719, 722.
See, e.g., id. at 767 (critiquing some child labor restrictions as contrary to a
right to self-support); Frances Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention In the Family, 18
U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 835, 852 (1985) (critiquing privatization of property for making
children dependent).
154 Appell, supra note 24, at 754.
155 Id. at 722.
156 Id. at 758, 779.
157 See, e.g., id. at 757-64.
158 Id. at 733 (criticizing CRC’s limitations); id. at 747 (noting need to
recognize children’s “agency and intentionality”).
159 Id. at 751.
160 Id. at 751-54.
161 See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
152
153
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and what it might take to implement thoroughgoing change.
Nonetheless, the ALI’s goal of spurring law reform would have
no chance of success with a proposed constitutional amendment
read to guarantee retrofitting of the family home,162 to call for
direct subsidies to children to promote their independence,163 and
to require parents to negotiate and justify their childrearing
decisions.164 Further, this framework could compel sweeping
revisions of existing ALI projects that have something to say
about children.165
Second, from a theoretical perspective, treating the
characteristics of childhood as disabilities reinforces adulthood
as the norm. Similar critiques have surfaced in analyses that
treat pregnancy as a disability for purposes of workplace
accommodation even though pregnancy is a “normal” event in
(female) life.166 Childhood, of course, is more widely “normal”
than even pregnancy; everyone who survives to adulthood has
experienced childhood, even if it is a socially and legally
constructed phase of life. The disability/accommodation frame
risks an understanding of children centered on what they lack,
rather than what they have. It thus bolsters the tendency to
treat children in a manner that emphasizes what they will
become later (adult citizens) instead of accepting them as
valuable members of society with meaningful interests and
experiences in the present tense.
c. Children and LGBT Persons
Some analogies suggest that the ALI should not
undertake a project on children at all, but rather should
integrate legal principles relevant to children in work on
various substantive topics, as relevant. In their contribution to
this symposium, The Restatement of Gay(?), Courtney Joslin
and Lawrence Levine urge this integrative approach in place of
a project devoted specifically to LGBT issues, important as
those issues are.167 As they observe, the “ALI does not have any
publications specifically devoted to the application of law to any
other identity-based group,” citing the absence, for example, of
See Appell, supra note 24, at 758.
See id. at 759.
164 See id. at 761.
165 See infra notes 171-76 and accompanying text.
166 See, e.g., Deborah Dinner, The Costs of Reproduction, 46 HARV. J. CIV.
RTS.-CIV. L. L. REV. 415, 473-77 (2011).
167 Courtney G. Joslin & Lawrence C. Levine, The Restatement of Gay(?), 79
BROOK. L. REV. 621 (2014).
162
163
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any Restatement of Race or Restatement of Gender (although
they do note the work in progress on American Indian law).168
They argue that separate treatment risks marginalization,
while the benefits of integration include the exposure of more
lawyers and judges to such matters and concerns.169
Applied to children, this integrative approach reflects
the ALI’s current course. Even beyond the entire chapters
devoted to custody and child support in the Principles of the
Law of Family Dissolution,170 one can find provisions on
children in ALI publications on torts,171 conflict of laws,172
contracts,173 property,174 restitution,175 and sentencing,176 to
name only a few illustrations. If followed exclusively, this
status quo would remove from the ALI’s consideration a
possible project on children and childhood.
Despite the force of Joslin and Levine’s argument for
LGBT issues (indeed, I join them in rejecting the idea of a
Restatement of Gay, as well as one on race or gender), I would
distinguish children from most other identity-based groups.
Law reform on race, gender, and sexual orientation has moved
steadily in one direction—toward assimilation or uniform
treatment177 (despite sometimes compelling arguments that
substantive equality requires recognizing difference178). For
children, however, different treatment remains the norm, and
some of the most recent developments, like the Supreme
Court’s cases about constitutional limits on punishment for
minors, highlight new justifications for such different
treatment.179 Children merit separate consideration by the ALI
and their own “Restatement of” (or “Principles of”), because law
treats children as a special class.

Id. at 626.
Id. at 627-30.
170 See supra notes 57 & 59 and accompanying text.
171 E.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 41 (2012).
172 E.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 22 (1971).
173 E.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 14 (1981).
174 E.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 8.2 (2003).
175 See Cheryl B. Preston & Brandon T. Crowther, Minor Restrictions:
Adolescence Across Legal Disciplines, the Infancy Doctrine, and the Restatement (Third)
of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, 61 KAN. L. REV. 343 (2012).
176 E.g., MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.11A (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2011).
177 See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979); Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v.
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007); Windsor v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
178 See generally, e.g., Dinner, supra note 166; Franklin, supra note 138;
Woodhouse, supra note 24, at 854.
179 See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
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An ALI project devoted to children would allow a more
systematic search for instances of such exceptional treatment
and evaluation of the classification itself. Only expansive and
sustained attention to the special class under existing laws
allows determination of what the extent of the exceptional
treatment should be and what it should entail. Piecemeal
consideration of children and childhood risks obfuscation of the
larger themes, rationales, and inconsistencies across the
different substantive areas.180
d. Children and Horses
Skepticism about a project devoted to children could
arise, by analogy, from the critique captured by Judge Frank
Easterbrook’s facetious phrase “The Law of the Horse.”
Easterbrook used the term, in reflecting on the then emerging
“law of cyberspace,”181 to emphasize how studying many subjectmatter-connected strands from diverse areas of the law would
necessarily come at the expense of appreciating the broader rules,
policies, and “unifying principles”182 at work in each of the areas,
as traditionally defined.183 In other words, one could certainly
study contracts about horses, personal injury cases involving
horses, and even criminal prosecutions for illegal gambling on
horse races—but so what? What would one learn?
Easterbrook’s analogy has been recalled and rejected with
respect to a particular slice of the law applicable to children,
adolescent medical decisionmaking.184 Amanda Pustilnik and
Leslie Henry contend that studying adolescent medical
decisionmaking exposes the absence of consensus about the
reasons for different laws and norms governing adolescents and

180 Cf. Todres, supra note 23, at 1107 (attempting holistic assessment of the
law’s approach to maturity).
181 See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse,
1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207 (1996).
182 Id. at 207.
183 Easterbrook explains:

Far better for most students—better, even, for those who plan to go into the
horse trade—to take courses in property, torts, commercial transactions, and
the like, adding to the diet of horse cases a smattering of transactions in
cucumbers, cats, coal, and cribs. Only by putting the law of the horse in the
context of broader rules about commercial endeavors could one really
understand the law about horses.
Id. at 208.
184 Amanda C. Pustilnik & Leslie Meltzer Henry, Introduction: Adolescent Medical
Decisionmaking and the Law of the Horse, 15 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 1 (2012).
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adults.185 In turn, such investigation “can elucidate a set of
general questions about doctrinal reliance, or lack thereof, on
neuroscientific evidence about human development and
behavior.”186
Neither Easterbrook’s critique of cyberlaw nor the
claimed value of studying adolescent medical decisionmaking
captures the work performed by the legal category of “child,”
however. Unlike the law of horses, or even cyberspace, the law of
childhood, as well as family law in which it is encompassed, does
reflect broader policies and unifying themes concerning
relationships, responsibilities, vulnerability, dependency, and
presumed affection. Moreover, unlike adolescent medical
decisionmaking, the value lies not in the exposure of the
inconsistent use of a particular type of evidence. The payoff from
systematically grappling with the legal treatment of children is
both narrower and broader: narrower because childhood itself
is an underexamined legal construct that merits focused
attention and broader because the task will require confronting
rules and policies in torts, contracts, and a host of other areas
in which the legal category of “child” plays a part.
CONCLUSION
Legal questions about children are critically important,
if only because they are so pervasive—in family law and well
beyond. Alongside the inconsistencies produced by the piecemeal
and diffuse regulation of children and childhood awaits the
conceptual hurdle of recognizing children’s own interests,
experiences, and agency while acknowledging, in varying
degrees, their dependency and vulnerability. These difficulties
deserve thorough, thoughtful, and creative analysis—or, in ALI
terms, clarification, modernization, and improvement. If the
ALI accepts the challenge, its contribution will necessarily be
significant. Restating childhood entails no less than defining a
field of law.

Id. at 2.
Id. The authors invoke Lawrence’s Lessig’s response to Easterbrook, which
“asserted that cyberlaw illuminated a general set of issues about the law’s ability to
function as a regulator in physical and non-physical space. The lessons of cyberlaw,
[Lessig] argued, could inform scholarship in many areas concerned with law’s
capacities and limits.” Id. (citing Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What
Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV. L. REV. 501 (1999)).
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